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Pramuan Bunkanwanicha is an Associate Professor of Finance at ESCP Europe - Paris Campus, where he teaches Corporate Finance, Emerging Markets Finance, and International Finance.
He received a Doctorate in Economics from the Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne in 2006 with an Habilitation in Management Sciences from the Université Paris - Dauphine in 2013. He also holds the degrees of MBA from AIT and B.Eng. from King Mongkut’s University of Technology North Bangkok. Prior to joining ESCP Europe, he was a visiting scholar at Columbia Business School and Yale University. He was also a visiting professor at Boston College and Hitotsubashi University.
His research lies at the intersection of family business, political connections, and finance. His research has been published in top-tier finance journals, namely the Review of Financial Studies and the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. His research has been also presented in major academic conference such as the American Finance Association (AFA), the Western Finance Association (WFA), the European Finance Association (EFA).
The Value of Marriage to Family Firms (with Joseph P.H. Fan and Yupana Wiwattanakantang)
Published in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2013, Vol. 48, Number 2, pp. 611-636.
This paper presents the first empirical evidence showing that the marriage of a member of the controlling family adds value to public corporations. The results, based on a uniquely comprehensive dataset from Thailand, show that the family firms's stock price increases when the partner is from a prominent business or political family. Abnormal returns tend to be higher for firms whose operation depends on extensive networks. In contrast, marriages to ordinary citizens are not associated with any abnormal returns. These findings are generally supportive of the value of networks in general and marriage in particular.
Big Business Owners and Politics (with Yupana Wiwattanakantang)
Published in Review of Financial Studies, 2009, Vol. 22, Number 6, pp. 2133-2168.
This paper investigates a little studied but common mechanism that firms use to obtain state favors: business owners themselves seeking election to top office. Using Thailand as a research setting, we find that the more business owners rely on government concessions or the wealthier they are, the more likely they are to run for top office. Once in power, the market valuation of their firms increases dramatically. Surprisingly, the political power does not influence the financing strategies of their firms. Instead, business owners in top offices use their policy-decision powers to implement regulations and public policies favorable to their firms. Such policies hinder not only domestic competitors but also foreign investors. As a result, these politically connected firms are able to capture more market share.
Debt and Entrenchment: Evidence from Thailand and Indonesia (with Jyoti Gupta and Rofikoh Rokhim)
Published in European Journal of Operational Research, 2008, Vol. 185, Issue 3, pp.1578-1595.
This paper examines the relation between debt and corporate governance in emerging market economies. We use firm-level panel data of listed companies from Thailand and Indonesia to analyze the firm's corporate financing behaviors in connection with its corporate governance arrangements. Our results show that the debt structure is linked to the corporate governance. We find that weaker corporate governance firms, in particular measured by the entrenchment effects, tend to have a higher debt level. The evidence is relatively stronger during the crisis period. Our results also shed lights on the importance of the country-specific institutional settings that would affect the empirical results.