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Biographie

Pramuan Bunkanwanicha est professeur au Département Finance du campus Paris d'ESCP Europe. Il est titulaire d’un Doctorat en Sciences Economiques de la Faculté Paris I- Panthéon-Sorbonne depuis 2006, ainsi que d’un MBA (Asian Institute of Technology) et un Bachelor of Engineering (King Mongkut’s Institute of Technology North Bangkok). Il a été étudiant visitant à Columbia Business School ainsi qu’au Centre de Croissance Economique de Yale University avant de rejoindre ESCP Europe.
Il enseigne actuellement les fondements de la finance, et un cours électif de finance sur les marchés émergeants dans le programme de Master in Management Grande Ecole.

Ses thèmes de recherche portent sur la finance internationale et la gouvernance d’entreprise, les entreprises familiales. Son article “Big business owners in politics” a été publié dans The Review of Financial Studies. Son papier a été présenté aux grandes conférences académiques, dont le colloque 2009 de la Western Finance Association (WFA) et le colloque 2007 de l’American Finance Association (AFA).

Recherche actuelle

Why Do Shareholders Value Marriage? (with Joseph P.H. Fan and Yupana Wiwattanakantang)

Abstract:
This paper studies marriages of top 150 business owners and their family members in Thailand during 1991-2006. Out of 200 marriages, more than two-thirds chose the partner from the business or political circle. In effect, via marriage, the controlling family can be closely connected to other influential families including business leaders and politicians. Indeed, investors recognize the value of the "network marriages." Stock prices of the family firms react strongly positively to the wedding news. Abnormal returns are in particular higher for the firms whose operation depends on having extensive networks for reliable information, lucrative contracts, and resource sharing. These firms are in the property and construction industries, based on state concessions, or in diversified business groups.

Big Business Owners and Politics (with Yupana Wiwattanakantang)
Published in Review of Financial Studies, 2009, Vol. 22 Number 6, pp. 2133-2168”

Abstract:
This paper investigates a little studied but common mechanism that firms use to obtain state favors: business owners themselves seeking election to top office. Using Thailand as a research setting, we find that the more business owners rely on government concessions or the wealthier they are, the more likely they are to run for top office. Once in power, the market valuation of their firms increases dramatically. Surprisingly, the political power does not influence the financing strategies of their firms. Instead, business owners in top offices use their policy-decision powers to implement regulations and public policies favorable to their firms. Such policies hinder not only domestic competitors but also foreign investors. As a result, these politically connected firms are able to capture more market share.


Debt and Entrenchment: Evidence from Thailand and Indonesia (with Jyoti Gupta and Rofikoh Rokhim)
Published in European Journal of Operational Research, 2008, Vol. 185, Issue 3, pp.1578-1595”

Abstract:
This paper examines the relation between debt and corporate governance in emerging market economies. We use firm-level panel data of listed companies from Thailand and Indonesia to analyze the firm's corporate financing behaviors in connection with its corporate governance arrangements. Our results show that the debt structure is linked to the corporate governance. We find that weaker corporate governance firms, in particular measured by the entrenchment effects, tend to have a higher debt level. The evidence is relatively stronger during the crisis period. Our results also shed lights on the importance of the country-specific institutional settings that would affect the empirical results.

Publications